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Abstract 
 
This review argues that implicit theories of malleability are essential constructs for the study 
of intergroup dynamics. As one of people’s core meaning-making tools, mindsets about 
malleability shed light on the mechanisms behind perceivers’ tendency to stereotype and feel 
prejudiced towards targets, as well as on the mechanisms underlying targets’ ability to shield 
against, and potentially confront, perceivers’ social bias. In addition to illuminating cross-
group interaction dynamics between individuals, mindsets contribute to explaining the 
harmful processes at play in real-world protracted conflicts, and suggest interventions that 
may help lay the ground for peace processes. This review also aims to highlight areas of 
research that remain open for further investigation, or that have been overlooked to date. We 
argue that research integrating mindsets and intergroup relations will advance to our 
understanding of intergroup dynamics, as well as possibly offering insights on how to 
improving them, and that this approach will also further the study of lay theories of 
malleability.   
 
 
 
  
 3
Implicit Theories (Mindsets) of Malleability Shape Intergroup Relations 
 
Do you believe that people’s core characteristics are malleable and can change? Or do 
you believe that they are fixed and stable over time? Why would your answers to these 
questions relate to your propensity to exhibit stereotyping and prejudice, as well as your 
responses to these intergroup dynamics? Historically, the study of intergroup relations has 
viewed beliefs about, and attitudes toward, specific groups as the focal constructs for 
explaining intergroup dynamics (Allport, 1954; Cardwell, 1996; Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, 
& Esses, 2013; Goffman, 1963; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). From this perspective, generalized 
lay beliefs about malleability, which by definition are not linked to specific group identities, 
are seemingly irrelevant. However, evidence suggests that people’s lay beliefs about 
malleability drive core intergroup dynamics: the expression of stereotyping and prejudice 
among perceivers, and responses to these forms of bias among targets. The purpose of this 
review is to integrate and summarize this body of work linking mindsets about malleability 
and people’s expression of, as well as responses to intergroup bias. In doing so, we hope to 
foster interest in further research integrating a lay theories approach into the study of 
intergroup relations. 
What are implicit theories (or mindsets) about malleability?  
People’s beliefs about the malleability of human characteristics (e.g., intelligence, 
personality, etc.) represent their lay theories, implicit theories, or mindsets (terms that we will 
use interchangeably; Dweck, 1999). Some people view human characteristics as fixed and 
stable, an “entity theory” or “fixed mindset,” whereas others view characteristics as malleable 
and able to change over time, an “incremental theory” or “growth mindset”. These beliefs, 
which may or may not be accurate, are people’s non-scientific understandings of the world, 
developed through experience and interactions with others (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 
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1999; Weiner, 1985; Weiner, Heckhausen, & Meyer, 1972). Lay theories are at the core of 
people’s meaning systems, i.e., the cognitive structures that help people to sort and make 
sense of the complex volume of social information that they encounter in the world (Heider, 
1958; Kelly, 1955; Piaget, Garcia, Davidson, & Easley, 1983). Because lay theories are 
descriptive and prescriptive (Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009), they shape how people interpret 
experiences, construct explanations, and form expectations.  
To measure lay theories, people are asked to report agreement or disagreement with 
statements such as, “Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much that they can 
do to really change that,” (“kind of person” lay theories; Dweck, 1999; Dweck, Chiu, & 
Hong, 1995), “Someone’s personality is a part of them that they can’t change very much,” 
(“personality” lay theories; Dweck, 1999; Dweck et al., 1995) or, “You can learn new things, 
but you can’t really change your basic intelligence,” (“intelligence” lay theories; Dweck, 
1999; Dweck et al., 1995). Agreeing with these statements suggests that one believes that 
people’s core attributes cannot change, which indicates an “entity theory” or “fixed mindset”; 
disagreeing with these statements suggests the belief that people’s core attributes can change, 
known as an “incremental theory” or “growth mindset”. These labels highlight which side of 
the normally-distributed continuum people fall toward (i.e., are not used as indicators of 
personality types; Dweck, 1999). Researchers have also experimentally manipulated these 
beliefs using seemingly scientific news articles proclaiming either that attributes are fixed or 
malleable (Bergen, 1991; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997), or with biased questionnaire 
manipulations that subtly encourage participants to express agreement with a target theory 
(Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; Rattan, Savani, Naidu, & Dweck, 2012).  
Lay theories are domain-specific, meaning that people need not – and often do not – 
hold the same fixed-growth beliefs across domains (Dweck et al., 1995; Levy, Plaks, Hong, 
Chiu, & Dweck, 2001). As we describe in the next sections, mindsets ranging from the 
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broader “kind of person” and personality theories (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck, 1999) to specific 
domains, such as intelligence (Dweck et al., 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) and prejudice 
(Carr, Dweck, & Pauker, 2012; Neel & Shapiro, 2012), to beliefs about the malleability of 
groups (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011; see also Rydell, Hugenberg, 
Ray, & Mackie, 2007) and the world (Dweck et al., 1995) have been found to be predictive of 
different intergroup outcomes (see Figure 1).  
It is also important to note that lay theories outside of the domain of malleability can 
also relate to intergroup outcomes, for example essentialism (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; 
Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010), lay theories of 
race as biological or socially constructed (Keller, 2005; Sanchez, Young, & Pauker, 2015; 
Verkuyten, 2003; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997), or 
diversity ideologies (Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Richeson & 
Nussbaum, 2004; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). It will be important for future research to further 
delineate the contributions of lay theories about malleability from other types of lay theories 
related to intergroup relations (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006; Levy, Chiu, & 
Hong, 2006; Murphy, Richeson, & Molden, 2011).  
A framework for understanding the influence of mindsets about malleability on 
intergroup relations. 
We frame the extant research linking lay theories and intergroup relations in terms of 
(1) the expression of stereotyping and prejudice among perceivers and (2) responses to 
stereotyping and prejudice among targets. “Perceivers” refer to those who observe others 
across group boundaries and exhibit bias. “Targets” of prejudice describe those who are 
subject to intergroup biases. Of course, these terms are imperfect delineations of reality, 
given that all individuals play both roles across situations (Richeson & Shelton, 2007; 
Shelton & Richeson, 2006; Shelton, Richeson, & Vorauer, 2006). Therefore, we also discuss 
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the role of mindsets in entrenched intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Halperin 
et al., 2011), which involve the same people as both perceivers and targets simultaneously. 
Theoretically, why would people’s naïve assumptions about whether characteristics 
are fixed or malleable intersect with intergroup dynamics? Recall that lay beliefs about 
malleability are at the core of people’s systems for understanding and interacting with the 
world (Dweck et al., 1995; Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009). Believing that core attributes are 
fixed and unchanging orients people toward diagnosing others’ traits, as these are seen as 
driving behavior, seeing evidence of those traits in behavior, and maintaining perceptions 
(Chiu et al., 1997; Erdley & Dweck, 1993). From a fixed mindset perspective, initial 
impressions and group memberships (as well as the attitudes and affect associated with these) 
offer meaningful information on outgroup members’ characteristics and future behavior, and 
therefore ought to be relied upon to a greater degree. A fixed mindset also fosters the desire 
to perform highly in desired domains to confirm that one has ability, and the perception that 
effort is indicative of a lack of ability, engendering an avoidance of challenge (Dweck & 
Legett, 1988). Although people who believe that core attributes are malleable and can be 
developed have an equal desire to understand and predict the world they encounter, their 
founding assumption demands that to do so, they attend to situational contexts and people’s 
internal states, rather than overly rely on group memberships (Chiu et al., 1997; Erdley & 
Dweck, 1993). Believing core attributes to be malleable also generates a desire to use effort 
to grow and develop and therefore more engagement with challenge and difficulty (Dweck & 
Legett, 1988).  
In the intergroup context, then, fixed mindsets ought to foster greater reliance on 
group memberships as diagnostic of character, concern with performing effectively in 
interactions, and an avoidance of challenging situations, whereas growth mindsets ought to 
foster greater attention to individual (rather than group) characteristics, more concern with 
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learning in interactions, and continued engagement in the face of difficulty. In the sections 
that follow, we highlight how these two perceptual orientations influence both perceivers’ 
expression of, and targets’ responses to, stereotyping and prejudice.  
Mindsets about malleability influence stereotype formation, endorsement, and 
maintenance.  
 People categorize others rapidly and automatically into in- versus out-group members 
(Ito, Thompson, & Cacioppo, 2004; Ito & Urland, 2003; Taylor, 1981), bringing associated 
content knowledge, known as stereotypes, online (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Freeman & 
Ambady, 2009, 2011; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995). While research has linked 
mindsets to stereotype formation, endorsement, and expression, virtually no research to date 
has investigated the initial and basic step of group categorization (but see Eberhardt, 
Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003, under Stereotype Maintenance below). While there is no 
reason to predict that lay theories about malleability should influence people’s basic ability to 
sort individuals into groups, it is possible that fixed mindsets would facilitate faster 
categorization of in- versus out-group status than growth mindsets, and that this initial 
categorization spurs some of the downstream effects of mindsets on stereotype formation, 
endorsement and maintenance reviewed below. This significant gap in the literature will be a 
fascinating area for future work to investigate. 
Stereotype Formation. To investigate the role of mindsets in stereotype formation, 
research has examined how readily people form stereotypes of novel groups. In one set of 
studies, 11-13 year-old children learned about a school where children performed bad acts, 
such as calling a peer’s artwork ugly or failing to help a classmate (Levy & Dweck, 1999). In 
another set of studies, adult undergraduates read about student groups at an unknown 
university who exhibited negative (e.g., pushing to the front of a line) or positive behaviors 
(e.g., sharing an umbrella) (Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). Researchers measured 
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participants’ beliefs about whether personality (Levy & Dweck, 1999) or the kind of person 
someone is (Levy et al., 1998) can change or not, and found that both children and adults 
who held fixed mindsets were more likely than those with growth mindsets to form 
stereotypes of these novel groups. For example, children who endorsed the entity lay theory 
of personality labeled the novel school as “mean” on average and applied this descriptor to 
more kids in the school, whereas children who endorsed the incremental belief labeled the 
school as “a little mean” on average and applied the label less globally (Levy & Dweck, 
1999). Similarly, adults used more trait descriptors and extreme adverbs (e.g., “very”, 
“always”) to describe the positive and negative groups when they held fixed rather than 
growth mindsets (Levy et al., 1998). Entity theorists also made their evaluations more 
quickly than incremental theorists, and reported greater satisfaction with the relatively 
minimal amount of information they had been offered (Levy et al., 1998). These patterns 
emerged both when participants’ mindsets had been measured and experimentally 
manipulated. It is not just that those with fixed views are more pessimistic whereas those 
with growth views are more optimistic, because entity theorists were relatively more 
predisposed to stereotyped judgments for both the negative and positive student groups (Levy 
et al., 1998).  
Stereotype Endorsement. Levy et al. (1998) assessed adults’ kind-of-person mindsets 
and then asked them to list societal stereotypes about African Americans, Asians, Caucasians, 
Hispanics-Latinos, and Jews. People with more fixed and more malleable views did not 
significantly differ in the number and types of societal stereotypes listed (Levy et al., 1998). 
However, when these participants next indicated their agreement with the stereotypes they 
had listed, differences emerged. Participants who held fixed mindsets were more likely to 
endorse the stereotypes as true than those who held growth mindsets (Levy et al., 1998). The 
influence of mindsets on stereotype endorsement is causal: participants exposed to either a 
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fixed or growth mindset about personality showed comparable results. Levy et al. (1998) 
documented an effect of mindsets on stereotyping over and above well-known predictors, 
such as social desirability, right-wing authoritarianism, attributional complexity, need to 
evaluate others, and personal need for structure. 
The research reviewed above focuses almost exclusively on explicit stereotyping, 
which raises the question of whether implicit stereotypes, or nonconscious cognitive 
associations (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek et al., 2007), are also shaped by 
mindsets about malleability. Because mindsets did not differentially predict people’s 
stereotype content knowledge (Levy et al., 1998), it may be that these lay theories are 
unrelated to implicit bias. Alternatively, because mindsets direct attention to theory-relevant 
information, mindsets may shape the strength of implicit associations. We hope future 
research will offer insight into this gap in the literature.  
Stereotype Maintenance. Stereotypes, once formed, are resistant to change 
(Bodenhausen, 1988; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989; Macrae, 
Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Yet, malleability beliefs can orient 
people toward individuating information, undercutting stereotypic perceptions. Plaks, 
Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman (2001) gave people information about a negatively 
stereotyped actor (Nazi), a positively stereotyped actor (priest), or a neutral actor (novel 
social group). When people read that the kind of person someone is can change (incremental 
theory condition), they allocated relatively more attention and memory to additional 
stereotype-inconsistent information (i.e., information that individualized the target person, 
Plaks et al., 2001). In comparison, when people read that the kind of person someone is 
cannot change (entity theory condition), they allocated relatively more attention and memory 
to stereotype-consistent information (i.e., information that confirmed the group membership, 
Plaks et al., 2001).  
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Research has shown these perceptual orientations not just in terms of social 
information, but also for physical representations. Eberhardt et al. (2003) measured 
participants’ kind-of-person theories and then showed them a picture of a racially ambiguous 
target person – a Black-White morph – labeled either “Black” or “White.” Later, participants 
had to identify who they had seen from two images, but in fact neither picture corresponded 
to the original face: one had been morphed with more of the original Black face, while the 
other had been morphed with more of the original White face, therefore showing more 
phenotypic stereotypicality of Blacks and Whites, respectively. In this context, entity 
theorists were more likely to choose the category-congruent face: when the initial label was 
“White,” they chose the phenotypically Whiter face, and when it was “Black,” they chose the 
phenotypically more Black face (Eberhardt et al., 2003). By contrast, incremental theorists 
chose the category-incongruent face, selecting the phenotypically Whiter face when the 
initial label read “Black,” and the phenotypically more Black face when it read “White” 
(Eberhardt et al., 2003). In another study, after an experimental manipulation of fixed and 
growth mindsets, participants drew from memory the Black-White morph. Judges, who never 
saw the original face or the racial label, classified drawings in the entity condition as more in 
line with the racial label that had been shown to participants, but they classified drawings in 
the incremental condition as more in line with the opposite racial label (Eberhardt et al., 
2003). Mindsets thus shaped participants’ representations of the racially ambiguous target 
person (even though they were equally accurate in recalling the label itself), either focusing 
them on the physical features indicative of the person’s fit with their racial category 
membership or focusing on the physical features that individuated them, contrasting away 
from the person’s racial category membership (Eberhardt et al., 2003). 
In sum, fixed mindsets predispose people toward forming and relying on stereotypes, 
doing so more quickly, and preferentially attending to and remembering stereotype-consistent 
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information relative to growth mindsets. There is still much to investigate. Intergroup 
relations research increasingly investigates the social perception of multiracial individuals 
(Chen, Moons, Gaither, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2014; Gaither, Pauker, Slepian, & Sommers, 
2016; Ho, Sidanius, Cuddy, & Banaji, 2013; Sanchez & Bonam, 2009). Given that fixed lay 
theories predispose people to view group boundaries as meaningful, might perceivers’ 
mindsets differentially influence reactions to multiracial individuals, who by definition 
challenge social category boundaries? Relatedly, theoretical perspectives on intersectionality 
highlight that intergroup dynamics must always be considered in context with a person’s 
diverse group memberships (Hall, Galinsky, & Phillips, 2015; Kulik, Roberton, & Perry, 
2007; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Rattan, Steele, & Ambady, 2016; Reid & Comas-
Diaz, 1990; Sesko & Biernat, 2010; Shields, 2008). If fixed mindsets orient people toward 
group identities more than growth mindsets, could entity theorists afford greater 
consideration to others’ double outgroup identities (Kang & Chasteen, 2009; Migdal, 
Hewstone, & Mullen, 1998; Remedios, Chasteen, Rule, & Plaks, 2011; Urban & Miller, 
1998) than incremental theorists? Research has also begun to link stereotypes across identity 
dimensions (e.g., race-gender or race-age stereotypes, Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013; Goff, 
Jackson, Di Leone, Culotta, & DiTomasso, 2014; Goff, Thomas, & Jackson, 2008; Hall et al., 
2015; Johnson, Freeman, & Pauker, 2012; McMahon & Kahn, 2016; Rattan, Levine, Dweck, 
& Eberhardt, 2012; Schug, Alt, & Klauer, 2015; Todd, Thiem, & Neel, 2016) and testing 
whether these links are facilitated, impeded, or unrelated to people’s mindsets may be a 
fruitful direction for further work. Future research on each of these topics will offer greater 
insight into these new directions of intergroup relations research, and they will also advance 
the study of mindsets by either replicating, complicating, or offering boundary conditions to 
our current understanding of lay theories’ impact on intergroup dynamics.  
Mindsets about malleability may influence the expression of prejudice.  
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 More research must be done to directly investigate the relationship between mindsets 
about malleability and measures of intergroup prejudice (Brewer, 1999; de Dreu, 2010; 
Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008; Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2011). Acknowledging this 
gap, and therefore cautioning against strong conclusions regarding mindsets and prejudice, 
we point to certain behavioral indicators of prejudice, including lack of affective warmth 
(Krysan, 2000; McConahay, 1986), avoidance of outgroups (Bogardus, 1947; Norton, 
Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006; Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton, 2009), 
awkwardness in interactions (Carr et al., 2012; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; 
MacInnis & Page-Gould, 2015; Shelton, Dovidio, Hebl, & Richeson, 2009; Vorauer & 
Kumhyr, 2001), and insensitivity toward the suffering of disadvantaged groups (Čehajić, 
Brown, & González, 2009; Harris & Fiske, 2006) that research has touched upon to date.  
 Levy et al. (1998) studied the formation of stereotypes about novel groups. They also 
measured affective negativity towards these groups on a scale from “very negative” (-100) to 
“very positive” (100; Levy et al., 1998), a measure reminiscent of classic thermometer 
measures of prejudice (McConahay, 1986). Fixed mindset participants exhibited significantly 
more prejudice toward the badly behaving group than growth mindset participants. Similarly, 
Levy & Dweck's (1999) study of stereotype formation included a measure of social 
distancing. Children generally did not want to interact with the novel group that behaved 
poorly, but entity theorists were more likely to socially distance (e.g., not attend a party, 
avoid friendships with the outgroup) compared to incremental theorists (Levy & Dweck, 
1999).  
Research has extensively documented that outgroup prejudice impairs helping (Cuddy, 
Rock, & Norton, 2007; Hornstein, 1978; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). 
Karafantis & Levy (2004) found correlational evidence that a growth kind of person mindset 
may relate to lower intergroup prejudice in this respect. 9-12-year-old children who endorsed 
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fixed (vs. growth) mindsets reported more negative attitudes, were less open to social 
interactions, and reported less past volunteering on behalf of low-income stigmatized 
children (Karafantis & Levy, 2004). After volunteering for the Trick-or-Treat for UNICEF 
Program raising funds for low-income stigmatized children, growth mindset children reported 
being more active volunteers, enjoying the experience more, and a greater willingness to 
volunteer again relative to fixed mindsets children (Karafantis & Levy, 2004).  
Some research has more directly investigated the relationship between mindsets and 
people’s readiness to act on their stereotypes in a discriminatory way. Prevalent stereotypes 
link men and leadership, or distance women from leadership (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; 
Simon & Hoyt, 2008). Hoyt & Burnette (2013) found correlational evidence that gendered 
ideals about leadership as stereotypically male were less likely to yield discriminatory 
evaluations of female leaders’ abilities when undergraduates held incremental rather than 
entity theories about the kind of person someone is. That is, a well-documented effect of 
gender prejudice emerged more among those who held fixed, rather than growth, beliefs 
about others’ ability to change (Hoyt & Burnette, 2013). 
The research reviewed above suggests that mindsets may play a role in the lack of 
affective warmth, avoidance of outgroups, and discriminatory treatment considered indicative 
of prejudice. However, a compelling body of work shows that a desire to perform well in 
intergroup situations can ironically engender similar outcomes, depending upon a person’s 
mindset about the malleability of prejudice itself. Intergroup situations can be conceptualized 
as performance contexts, and as noted earlier, fixed versus growth lay theories afford 
different goals and outlooks in such contexts (performance versus learning; Dweck & Leggett, 
1998). In both correlational and experimental studies, majority group members who held 
fixed mindsets about the nature of prejudice requested less information about racial bias, 
wanted to and did exit intergroup interactions more, and engaged with learning opportunities 
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around issues of race and racism less than majority group members who held growth 
mindsets about prejudice (Carr et al., 2012; Neel & Shapiro, 2012). This withdrawal from 
intergroup contexts as a function of mindsets about prejudice extended to patterns of social 
distancing; when preparing for an intergroup interaction, fixed mindset participants set chairs 
almost 10 inches further away from each other, compared to growth mindset participants 
(Carr et al., 2012). When participants were tasked with actually interacting with an outgroup 
member or discussing issues of race and diversity, fixed mindset perceivers exhibited more 
anxious, negative, and disengaged nonverbal behaviors (Carr et al., 2012; Neel & Shapiro, 
2012). These differences emerged even after controlling for participants’ actual racial bias 
(Carr et al., 2012; Neel & Shapiro, 2012), suggesting that a fixed mindset about prejudice can 
paradoxically engender one of the classic behavioral markers of prejudice in intergroup 
interactions. In line with these findings, research has found that, for both minority and 
majority group members, taking an intergroup learning (vs. performance) orientation leads to 
greater levels of comfort and interest in engaging in interactions with outgroup members 
(Migacheva & Tropp, 2012; Murphy et al., 2011).  
This research reveals two routes to behaviors typically characterized as biased. On the 
one hand, some evidence suggests that those who view people’s personality (or the kind of 
person someone is) as fixed tend to exhibit behaviors traditional considered markers of 
prejudice. On the other hand, regardless of their level of prejudice, those who view prejudice 
as fixed come to exhibit similarly disengaged and distancing behaviors. Foremost, more 
research is necessary to understand these nuances in the expression of prejudiced behavior. 
At the same time, perhaps findings such as encourage us to reconsider the definition of 
prejudice, or at least its commonly agreed-upon behavioral indicators. Addressing these 
questions would ensure that operationalizations of prejudice appropriately reflect the 
complex and dynamic reality of bias in the modern age.  
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Mindsets about malleability and targets’ responses to being stereotyped.   
Much research has documented the negative consequences of social identity threat, 
the concern about confirming negative stereotypes about one’s group in diagnostic contexts 
in which group memberships are salient (Spencer, Logel, & Davies, 2016; Steele & Aronson, 
1995). Targets of prejudice under stereotype threat exhibit increased anxiety, learn less, 
perform worse, feel less like they belong, and show greater attrition (Good, Rattan, & Dweck, 
2012; Jamieson & Harkins, 2007; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 
2008; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Taylor & Walton, 2011). Social identity threats arise in 
diagnostic situations, and as noted above, fixed mindsets treat performance situations as 
diagnostic of ability, whereas growth mindsets treat these same situations as opportunities for 
challenge and learning (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 
1988). Given this, might a growth mindset buffer members of stigmatized groups from the 
negative performance and belonging consequences of social identity threats? Aronson et al. 
(2002) conducted a field experiment in which students received training on the growth 
mindset about intelligence: they watched an instructional video offering evidence that 
intelligence can grow, wrote a letter sharing these ideas with a middle school student, and 
finally transformed their letter into a audiotaped speech. Nine weeks later, African American 
students in the growth mindset condition showed significant increases in their reported 
enjoyment of academics, identification with academic achievement, and actual academic 
performance (controlling for SAT scores), compared to those in the two control conditions, 
who had either received training about the “multifaceted” nature of intelligence or no training 
at all (Aronson et al., 2002). Another field experiment that implemented a growth mindset 
intervention found a positive effect of growth mindsets about intelligence on Latino/Hispanic 
seventh-grade girls’ performance on the math portion of their end-of-year state standardized 
test (Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003). Relatedly, Dar-Nimrod & Heine (2006) found that 
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characterizing math ability as genetic (a view congruent with fixed mindsets) led women to 
underperform on a math test relative to when math ability had been characterized as 
environmentally determined (a more growth-congruent view). Conversely, performance 
benefits ensue when fixed views bolster positive stereotypes about one’s group, for example 
Asians and men in math (Mendoza-Denton, Kahn, & Chan, 2008).  
Studying the impact of mindsets on targets of bias has led to the novel insight that, 
separate from one’s own lay theories, mindsets communicated by others in the environment, 
the field, or the workplace setting can play a meaningful role in outcomes (Good et al., 2012; 
also see Murphy & Dweck, 2010). Good et al. (2012) found that undergraduate women who 
simultaneously perceived high stereotyping and a fixed mindset about intelligence in their 
math classrooms exhibited decrements to their sense of belonging, whereas those who 
perceived similarly high gender stereotyping but instead a growth mindset about intelligence 
maintained their sense of belonging to math. In turn, women’s higher sense of belonging to 
math was associated with a greater desire to pursue math in the future and higher end-of-term 
math grades, showcasing broader consequences for performance and retention (Good et al., 
2012). Mindsets can thus buffer targets against the psychological impact of negative 
stereotypes about the ingroup. In organizational settings, Emerson & Murphy (2015) found 
that STEM workplaces that espoused fixed (rather than growth) mindsets about ability were 
less trusted by women because women felt greater concern about being stereotyped. The 
consequences may be particularly damaging in the context of difficulty; women who 
anticipated performing poorly in an interview were more likely to disengage if the company 
had endorsed a fixed (vs. growth) mindset. Relatedly, Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer, & Freeland 
(2015) showed that the more faculty view performance in their field as stemming from innate 
genius (a fixed-mindset view), the less likely it is for women to receive Ph.D.s in the field. 
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This body of research suggests that encouraging growth mindsets about ability among 
individuals, fields of study, and organizations could offer a fruitful means for intervening 
across levels to support the talent and potential of targets of prejudice (see Rattan, Savani, 
Chugh, & Dweck, 2015). At the same time, members of stigmatized groups exhibit a wide 
array of negative psychological and physical health outcomes as a result of bias (Feagin & 
Sikes, 1994; Harrell, Hall, & Taliaferro, 2003; Richeson & Shelton, 2007; Sawyer, Major, 
Casad, Townsend, & Mendes, 2012; Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2003; Williams & 
Williams-Morris, 2000), and future research should investigate whether and how mindsets 
about malleability play a role in these outcomes. To the degree that extant research suggests 
growth mindsets buffer the negative consequences of social identity threat, it is possible that 
they may compose part of a psychological self-defense system that protects against a myriad 
of negative outcomes associated with experiencing bias.   
 
Mindsets about malleability and targets’ responses to overt expressions of prejudice.  
 Turning from the influence of subtle stereotyping to the persistence of overt 
expressions of bias in everyday social interactions (Ely, Meyerson, & Davidson, 2006; Sue, 
2010), we see that mindsets about malleability play a role in who confronts bias. Of course, 
no one should ever be expected to address bias, but research suggests targets want to do so, 
yet often feel held back from speaking out (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006; Swim 
& Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Rattan & Dweck (2010) theorized that a 
growth mindset might offer targets of prejudice the underlying motivation to address bias, 
with the goal of catalyzing change in the perpetrator of bias. Conversely, because a fixed 
view of others means that someone who is biased will remain biased, this perspective might 
undercut targets’ motivation to confront. Indeed, when racial minority undergraduates 
experienced a biased statement from a majority group member, those who held an 
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incremental theory of others’ personality (either measured or manipulated) were more likely 
to speak out to express their disagreement with the biased statement than those who held 
fixed views, although everyone was equally offended by the statement. 
 In studies of minorities’ and women’s expectations following an experience with 
prejudice, Rattan & Dweck (2016) found that a growth mindset only engendered benefits for 
minorities’ and women’s outlook on future relations, sense of belonging, and workplace 
satisfaction, when they had also reported confronting prejudice. Absent this positive change-
oriented action, minorities and women who held growth mindsets showed as negative 
outlooks and feelings as did fixed mindset participants (regardless of whether they had 
spoken out or not). These findings raise exciting new questions about the broader situational 
and behavioral factors that may be necessary for growth mindsets to yield benefits, and 
highlights the possiblity that there may be limits to the benefits of growth mindsets, topics 
that deserve significantly greater attention.  
Mindsets about malleability across the perceiver-target divide: resolving entrenched 
conflicts.  
 Mindsets also play a role in the context of real-world protracted conflicts, or conflicts 
with a history of failed peace-making attempts (Bar-Tal, 2001; Coleman, 2003). In this 
context, maintaining a sense of hope for reconciliation can be essential. Cohen-Chen, 
Halperin, Crisp, & Gross (2014) found that Jewish Israelis who believed (or were led to 
believe) that the nature of conflicts is malleable, rather than fixed, reported significantly 
greater hope about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Greater hope, in turn, led growth mindset 
participants to report significantly greater willingness to compromise on core issues of the 
conflict, compared to fixed mindset participants. Relatedly, Saguy and Halperin (2014) 
showed that after seeing an outgroup member exhibit criticism toward his own group, only 
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those who held growth mindsets about groups felt more hopeful, whereas fixed mindset 
participants were unaffected. 
In addition to promoting positive group-based emotions, growth mindsets can also 
mitigate negative ones. Turkish Cypriot participants led to hold an incremental (vs. entity) 
theory about their opponents’ behaviors in violent conflicts reported significantly lower 
anxiety at the thought of encountering a Greek Cypriot (Halperin et al., 2012). As a result, 
they were more likely than those with a fixed mindset to pick a Greek rather than Turkish 
Cypriot partner to discuss solutions to the conflict (Halperin et al., 2012).  
Setting the stage for compromise in such conflicts is key. Wohl et al. (2015) showed 
that individuals who hold a growth mindset about the malleability of groups are more open to 
accepting remorse from the other side, and thus report significantly greater willingness to 
accept a collective apology, reciprocate, and initiate a peace process compared to fixed 
mindset participants. Levontin, Halperin, & Dweck (2013) linked mindsets about the 
malleability of personality and people’s propensity to hold on to dispositional attributions for 
the outgroup’s behaviors. Jewish Israeli participants exposed to an entity theory and led to 
make dispositional attributions for Israeli Arabs’ behavior exhibited significantly lower 
willingness to compromise in the conflict, lower support of civil rights, and higher levels of 
negative stereotyping towards Israeli Arabs than those led to make situational attributions; 
participants in the incremental condition did not show these differential effects of attribution-
type, suggesting that a growth mindset can mitigate the negative effects of dispositional 
attributions in longstanding conflicts. 
In sum, viewing personality, groups, conflicts, or the world as malleable rather than 
fixed may promote paths toward progress and peace in intractable conflicts. Future research 
should test the viability of growth mindset interventions over the longer-term, to test whether 
they maintain their effectiveness even in the face of setbacks to the peace process. 
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Conclusion: Mindsets about malleability matter for intergroup relations.  
 We have reviewed the growing body of research linking mindsets about malleability 
to perceivers’ expressions of, and targets’ responses to, stereotyping and prejudice. From this 
review, it is evident that the study of intergroup relations would be incomplete without a 
consideration of people’s lay beliefs about malleability. The reverse is also true: those who 
study lay theories must consider the unique insights that will be offered through further study 
of intergroup relations. For example, considering the many links between mindsets and 
intergroup dynamics, research would do well to consider the possibility that early, formative 
intergroup interactions may be one source of people’s fixed versus growth mindsets. 
Considering the many domains of mindsets that have been shown to influence intergroup 
dynamics, we suggest that future research should also focus on the development of a 
theoretical framework for organizing which domains of malleability beliefs matter most for 
our behavior and reactions in intergroup situations, and why. In doing so, the study of 
intergroup relations will advance our basic understanding of lay theories, in terms of the 
relative importance of different domains in mindsets for intergroup outcomes, and boundary 
conditions of different domain-specific beliefs.  
We have highlighted many areas for further research into these topics, which we hope 
will offer meaningful theoretical advances both in the domain of intergroup relations and in 
our understanding of people’s lay theories. If the goal is to better understand and ultimately 
intervene to improve intergroup relations in society, the study of mindsets will undoubtedly 
be an essential component.  
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Figure 1: Mindsets about malleability drive the building blocks of intergroup dynamics.  
 
 
 
 
Mindsets and the Expression of Stereotypes and Prejudice among Perceivers Mindsets and Responses to 
Stereotypes and Prejudice 
among Targets 
Mindsets across the 
Perceiver-Target 
Divide in Entrenched 
Conflicts 
 Explicit stereotypes Prejudice 
expression 
Implicit 
stereotypes 
Overt 
prejudice  Knowledge  Formation  Endorsement Maintenance 
 
 
 
 
Fixed 
mindsets 
are 
associated 
with… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No differences 
in stereotype 
content 
knowledge  
Greater 
propensity to 
form more 
extreme 
stereotypes 
more quickly, 
and to exhibit 
greater 
satisfaction 
when minimal 
information is 
available 
Greater tendency 
to endorse group 
stereotypes as 
true 
Greater 
attention 
allocated to 
stereotypical 
information or 
characteristics 
that confirm a 
person’s group 
membership 
Greater 
propensity to 
express 
behavioral 
signs of 
prejudice 
(negative 
attitudes, social 
distancing, 
awkwardness) 
in intergroup 
interactions 
Lower 
performance, 
sense of 
belonging, 
identification, 
and 
engagement in 
domains in 
which negative 
stereotypes 
exist 
 
Lower 
likelihood 
of 
confronting 
overt 
prejudice 
Lower hope, greater 
anxiety about 
intergroup contact, 
less willingness to 
compromise and 
initiate a peace 
process 
 
 
 
 
Growth 
mindsets 
are 
associated 
with… 
 
 
Lower 
propensity and 
readiness to 
form extreme 
stereotypes, 
less 
satisfaction 
with minimal 
information 
about groups 
Lower tendency 
to endorse group 
stereotypes as 
true 
Greater 
attention 
allocated to 
individualizing 
information  
Lower 
propensity to 
express 
behavioral 
signs of 
prejudice 
(negative 
attitudes, social 
distancing, 
awkwardness) 
in intergroup 
interactions 
Buffered 
performance, 
sense of 
belonging, 
identification, 
and 
engagement in 
domains in 
which negative 
stereotypes 
exist. 
Greater 
likelihood 
to confront 
overt 
prejudice 
Greater hope, lower 
anxiety about 
intergroup contact, 
greater propensity to 
to compromise and 
initiate a peace 
process 
Domain of 
mindset 
• “Kind of 
person” 
(Levy et 
al., 1998) 
• Personality 
(Levy & 
Dweck, 
1999) 
• Personality 
(Chiu et al., 
1997)  
• “Kind of 
• “Kind of 
person” 
(Eberhardt 
et al., 
• “Kind of 
person” 
(Hoyt& 
Burnette, 
• Intelligenc
e (Aronson 
et al., 2002; 
Emerson & 
• Persona
lity 
(Rattan 
& 
• Groups (Halperin 
et al., 2012; Saguy 
& Halperin, 2014; 
Wohl et al., 2015) 
 39 
• “Kind of 
person” 
(Levy et al., 
1998) 
person” 
(Levy et al., 
1998) 
2003; 
Plaks et al., 
2001) 
2013; 
Karafantis 
& Levy, 
2004; Levy 
et al., 
1998) 
• Personality 
(Levy & 
Dweck, 
1999) 
• Prejudice 
(Carr et al., 
2012; Neel 
& Shapiro, 
2012) 
Murphy, 
2015; 
Good et al., 
2003; 
Murphy & 
Dweck, 
2010)  
• Math 
intelligenc
e (Dar-
Nimrod & 
Heine, 
2006; 
Good et al., 
2012; 
Mendoza-
Denton et 
al., 2008) 
• Field-
specific 
ability 
(Leslie et 
al., 2015) 
Dweck, 
2010) 
• Nature of conflicts 
(Cohen-Chen et 
al., 2014) 
• Personality 
(Levontin et al., 
2013) 
 
 
